

14 May 1982

25X1



1. The attached document is invaluable from a warning standpoint and deserves careful study. I propose the warning staff undertake the research. The objective is to provide the DCI and his NSC counterparts (and possibly NFIB principals) an assurance that the Community has correctly analyzed the Soviet/WP requirements and procedures to prepare for War, and that collection processing and analytic efforts are focused on the correct activities and events which would alert us to Soviet/WP preparations.

2. The outline for approaching the problem is as follows:

a. Compare, in detail, this document with:

1) General Indicator List

2) DIA WWIMS List

b. Compare this document with

• NIE 4-1-78 "Warning of War in Europe"

• IIM Soviet Naval Force Readiness

• IIM Soviet Air Forces Readiness

• IIM Soviet Ground Forces Readiness (when completed)

• NIE 11-14-81 WP Forces Opposite NATO

• NIE 11-3/8-81 Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict

• Others if appropriate

c. Assuming steps a&b demonstrate an adequate understanding of the process, review collection requirements to determine if the events, actions, indicators are in fact tasked for collection.

d. If there are major gaps revealed by c (which I doubt), it may be necessary to ascertain the reason, lack of collection capability or lack of adequate analyst generated requirements.

3. We presently have on file in SWS a 1970 predecessor document. It may be useful to compare the two and see how WP procedures have matured over the past ten years.

4. On the assumption that we will find no major surprises, such a research effort would allow this document to be exploited and tacitly incorporated into Community thinking and publications without giving it wide dissemination. It could also provide an implicit broadgage guideline for the tough management decisions on allocation of reseources to the warning problem.

5. If you approve, I will arrange to get a copy from Mr. 25X1 and get started.

25X1

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

13 May 1982

NOTE FOR:

[Redacted]

FROM :

[Redacted]

Enclosed are the readings on warning that
I promised.

Please accept my apologies for the delay;
I discovered that most of the volumes were out
of print. As I indicated in our discussions,
they are very informative to anyone involved
in the warning business. I am sure you will
find them most interesting.

Regards, /

[Redacted]

25X1

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

13 May 1982

NOTE FOR:

FROM :

[Redacted]

NIO/W

25X1

Enclosed are the readings on warning that I promised [Redacted] They have been assembled by our colleagues in DIA over the past four years. While some individual articles are superficial, the readings as a whole capture the essence of the warning problem and are worth your attention.

Regards,

[Redacted]

25X1

I & W READINGS

FORECAST **MILITARY INDICATORS** **CRISIS MANAGEMENT**
TACTICAL WARNING

DECEPTION

TECHNICAL SURPRISE

SUPRISE ATTACK **INDICATIONS**

PREDICTION



WARNING

PARADOX OF WARNING
POLITICAL INDICATORS

CRY WOLF SYNDROME
WARNING INTELLIGENCE


STRATEGIC WARNING

DISINFORMATION


OCTOBER 1981




INDICATIONS and WARNING READINGS



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MORE READINGS ON WARNING



1979



I & W READINGS ON THE YOM KIPPUR WAR



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